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HYPOTHETICAL REASONING IN LOGIC PROGRAMS 
KATSUMI INOUE 
D In order to express incomplete knowledge, extended logic programs have 
been proposed as logic programs with classical negation along with nega- 
tion as failure. This paper discusses ways to deal with a broad class of 
common sense knowledge by using extended logic programs. For this 
purpose, we present a uniform approach for dealing with both incomplete 
and contradictory programs, as a simple framework of hypothetical reason- 
ing in which some rules are dealt with as candidate hypotheses that can be 
used to augment the background theory. This theory formation framework 
can be used for default reasoning, contradiction removals, the closed world 
assumption, and abduction. We also show a translation of the theory 
formation framework to an extended logic program whose answer sets 
correspond to the consistent belief sets of augmented theories. a 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent investigations in theories of logic programming have revealed a close 
relationship between the semantics of logic programs containing negation as failure 
and other theories of nonmonotonic reasoning developed in AI. Now, logic 
programming can be viewed as a simplified format of more general nonmonotonic 
logics such as default logic [36] and autoepistemic logic [27]. Although such a 
connection is useful for the better understanding of logic programs, it is not 
enough merely to define a logic program as a subset of a language capable of 
nonmonotonic reasoning: we would also like to know how such a language can be 
used for solving various problems and want to apply logic programming to common 
sense reasoning. However, there have been few discussions as to how to represent 
knowledge of the sorts of problems using logic programming (or other nonmono- 
tonic logics). In this paper, we will discuss a general framework based on logic 
programming for formalizing various forms of common sense reasoning. 
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An important step for representation of common sense knowledge is to allow 
classical negation ( 7 ) in logic programs (called extended logic programs [ 111) along 
with negation as failure (not). A semantics of an extended logic program can be 
given by its answer sets, which is a suitable extension of the stable models [lo] of a 
general logic program. As discussed by Gelfond and Lifschitz [ll], an important 
aspect of classical negation is that we can represent incomplete information by 
extended logic programs. This paper considers further the usefulness of classical 
negation in logic programming, and present methods to deal with broader classes 
of common sense knowledge. 
The first point we should clarify is the role and effect of classical negation in 
various forms of reasoning. An extended logic program may be contradictory when 
both an atom A and its negation 1A are derivable, whereas a definite Horn 
program never causes a contradiction. That is, when we incorporate classical 
negation in programs, the notion of consistency becomes more important. We will 
summarize the notion, semantics, and properties of classical negation in logic 
programming in Section 2. 
Next, we will apply the notion of consistency to various kinds of reasoning in 
Section 3, focusing particularly on default reasoning (Section 3.1) and abduction 
(Section 3.4) as two basic forms of intelligent reasoning. We also consider contru- 
diction removals (Section 3.2) and the closed world assumption (Section 3.3) as other 
important functions with which logic programming should cope. To deal with these 
applications, however, instead of showing individually how each style of reasoning 
can be expressed using extended logic programs, we shall propose a uniform 
framework for representing all of them. The basic idea behind this uniformity lies 
in two facts: 
1. The notion of consistency mentioned above is also crucial for theory forma- 
tion, that is, for selecting (or rejecting) appropriate (or inappropriate) theo- 
ries that are formed from an incomplete description about the world by 
augmenting it with hypotheses. 
2. As argued in studies of Theorist systems [32, 14, 311 and others, the idea of 
theory formation is very useful for prototyping many AI reasoning systems by 
providing a simple “hypothesize-and-test” framework, that is, hypothetical 
reasoning. Then, hypothetical reasoning can be applied to both default and 
abductive reasoning. 
Based on the idea of theory formation and hypothetical reasoning, we shall 
propose a very simple notion of knowledge systems. Formally, a knowledge system 
K is represented by a pair, CT, H), where 
1. each of T and H is an extended logic program, 
2. T represents a set of facts’ that are known to be true in the world, and 
3. H represents a set of candidate hypotheses that may be expected to be true. 
Then, the task of a knowledge system is theory formation, that is, to find a subset E 
of H such that T U E is consistent. By using this mechanism, the two types of 
‘In the logic programming community, “facts” traditionally mean atomic formulas asserted in a 
program (i.e., rules without bodies) and are distinguished from “rules” (with nonempty bodies). Here, 
however, any rule with or without body can be either a fact or a hypothesis. The distinction between 
facts and hypotheses is therefore determined not syntactically, but by the user’s intention. 
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reasoning mentioned above can be characterized simply as follows: 
1. Default reasoning. Find a maximal subset E of H such that T U E is 
consistent. 
2. Abduction. Find an explanation E (L H) of a formula 0 such that 6) T U E 
is consistent and (ii) 0 is derived from TUE. 
The preceding view of default reasoning as theory formation can be best seen in 
Poole’s [31] framework based on the Theorist system [32]. The syntactical differ- 
ence of our knowledge system- from Poole’s framework is that, whereas the latter 
uses first-order logic, ours uses extended logic programs as a “host” language. 
Then, for knowledge systems, the fact that a formula has an explanation does not 
imply that the formula holds in a maximally consistent augmentation (an example 
will be given in Example 3.20). In this sense, default reasoning is clearly distin- 
guished from abduction. 
We will also apply a knowledge system to the closed world assumption. As an 
example of extended logic programs, Gelfond and Lifschitz [ll] consider the 
inference of negation using the closed world assumption, which can be represented 
by augmenting the program with rules of the form 
where A is any ground atom. However, they do not deal with them as hypotheses 
distinct from the program, but include them in the program. Suppose, for example, 
that the program consist of two rules: 
Q +- lP(A), ,P(B), 
1Q-, 
and let us consider the closed world assumption for the predicate P: 
3(x) +notP(x). 
If these rules are conjoined, no answer set is available. Instead, however, we would 
like to get two maximally consistent answer sets, {-J’(A), TQ} and {7P(B), TQ], 
by dealing with these extra rules as distinct rules that can be invalidated or ignored 
when they cause inconsistencies. Furthermore, sometimes hypotheses may be 
added to make an incoherent program get consistent answer sets. Thus, the 
proposed framework can also be viewed as a system for inconsistency resolution or 
contradiction removal. 
A naive computation to find a maximally consistent set of hypotheses would be 
carried out by searching through the power set of H, starting from the whole set H 
as the initial E and removing one rule from E at a time until we get consistent 
answer sets of TUE. In Section 4, we will show alternative methods for the 
computation by translating a knowledge system K = CT, H) to an extended Zogic 
program K* such that each answer set of K* corresponds to an answer set of 
T U E, where E is a subset of H such that T U E is consistent. Then, in Section 5, 
the transformed extended logic program K* will be further transformed to a 
general ogic program. Thus, through these transformations, any knowledge system 
can be characterized by an equivalent extended (or general) logic program. 
As explained at the beginning of this section, this paper is not intended to 
establish a further connection between general nonmonotonic reasoning for- 
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malisms and logic programming. Such a mathematical analysis is also an important 
issue, but it is not the subject of this paper. Instead, we will show how our theory 
formation framework can explain uniformly various recent proposals of knowledge 
representation in logic programming. To verify this claim, the proposed framework 
will be compared to many other reasoning systems based on logic programming [7, 
19, 8, 22, 13, 29, 14, 11 in Section 6. In particular, the proposed method for 
inconsistency resolution is different from the TMS-style consistency maintenance. 
Whereas the TMS adds a new rule to remove inconsistency, our proposal disre- 
gards a minimal set of hypotheses to remove incoherency. In this sense, the 
proposed framework can be considered as a generalization of nonmonotonic 
ATMSs [5, 181. 
2. BACKGROUND 
This section presents basic properties of extended logic programs introduced by 
Gelfond and Lifschitz [ll], on which our theory formation framework is based. 
2.1. Classical Negation 
The most important innovation of extended logic programs is that classical negation 
is allowed to be used in programs. There are at least four reasons why classical 
negation is important for hypothetical reasoning: 
1. The incorporation of classical negation into programs allows us to deal 
directly with incomplete information in representing knowledge as well as in 
answering queries. Then the open world assumption is employed for each 
incomplete definition of a predicate, but still we can freely specify the cZosed 
world assumption by using classical negation, as discussed by Gelfond and 
Lifschitz [ll] (see also Section 3.3). 
2. The idea of allowing classical negation that appears in the heads of some 
rules is very useful to formalize exceptions to general rules. For instance, a 
study of representation of legislation by Kowalski [20] suggests that it is 
natural to express legal rules using classical negation, and Kowalski and Sadri 
[22] argue that a simple form of default reasoning can be dealt with very easily 
by using classical negation. 
3. The introduction of classical negation provides us with the power to write 
contradictory rules. This is essential not only for abduction but for any kind 
of theory formation because, as argued by Goebel, Furukawa, and Poole [14l, 
we are interested in systems that can deduce contradictions to reject inconsis- 
tent theories. This usage of classical negation is therefore similar to the notion 
of integrity constraints. 
4. As we will see in Section 4, even in the notion of the simplest form of 
candidate hypotheses, that is, those in the form of ground atomic formulas, 
there appears to be the concept of classical negation. An atom A can be 
assumed to be true if it is consistent with a theory, that is, if 1A is not 
derived from a theory. This fact suggests that we may transform each 
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candidate hypothesis into a rule using both classical negation and negation as 
failure. 
2.2. Answer Sets 
Now, we define the syntax and semantics of logic programs with classical negation 
in a way slightly extended from Gelfond and Lifschitz 1111. 
Definition 2.1. An extended logic program is a set of rules, which are either of the 
form 
L+L, )...) L,,notL,+ ,,..., notL, (1) 
or of the form 
+--L 1 ,..., L,, notL,+I ,..., notL,, (2) 
where n 2 m 2 0, and L and Lis are literals each of which is either an atom A 
or its negation -A. For a rule of the form Cl), L is called the head of the rule, 
and for a rule of the form either (1) or (21, L,, . . . , L,, not L,, ,, . . . , not L,I is 
the body of the rule. Each rule of the form (2) is called an integrity constraint. 
In the foregoing definition, we allow integrity constraints as rules with empty 
heads, which are not explicitly defined in Gelfond and Lifschitz [ll] in a program. 
Although there are several other logical specifications of integrity constraints (see 
[37] for their differences), here we regard integrity constraints as epistemic or 
metalevel statements about “what a logic program should know” or “what should 
be true about a logic program” (see also Section 6.6).’ Note that in the epistemic 
view, integrity constraints are usually defined as first-order formulas and are 
separated from other rules. However, every integrity constraint in the form of a 
first-order formula F can be first characterized as a rule without a head, + not F, 
then translated into rules using the transformation of Lloyd and Topor [2.5]. For 
instance, an integrity constraint P II Q can be expressed by + P, not Q. This 
translation is also employed by Sadri and Kowalski [39]. In this way, we can include 
integrity constraints in a program so that we do not have to distinguish them from 
other rules. 
The semantics of extended logic programs can be given in various ways: the 
answer set semantics [ll], the extended stable semantics [33], and others. In this paper 
we choose the answer set semantics, although other semantics may be applicable to 
our framework of hypothetical reasoning. The choosing of the semantics will be 
reconsidered in Section 6.4. In the semantics of extended logic programs, a rule 
containing variables stands for the set of its ground instances. We denote by Lit 
the set of ground literals in the language. Then the semantics of an extended logic 
program is given by its answer sets in the following two steps. 
‘Note that Reiter considers a program as a set of first-order formulas and characterizes integrity 
constraints (and queries) as a set of epistemic formulas (called KFOPCE) [37]. In our case, both a 
program and integrity constraints are expressed as extended logic programs. This is an extension of 
(monotonic) databases to (nonmonotonic) knowledge bases, whose semantics can be partially given by 
using Levesque’s autoepistemic logic [23]. The exact epistemic semantics of default logic and extended 
logic programs are considered in Lifschitz [24]. 
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Definition 2.2. Let II be a set of ground rules not containing not. The answer set, 
a(n), of II is the smallest subset S of Lit satisfying the following conditions: 
1. For any rule L + L,, . . . , L, in II, if L,, . . . , L, E S, then L E S. 
2. For any integrity constraint +-L,, . . ., L, in II, if L,, . . ., L, E S, then 
S = Lit. 
3. If S contains a pair of complementary literals, then S = Lit. 
De@zition 2.3. Let lI be any extended logic program without variables. For any set 
S c Lit, let II’ be the set of rules without not obtained from II by deleting 
1. every rule containing a formula not L in its body with L E S and 
2. every formula not L in the bodies of the remaining rules. 
Then, S is an an.swer set of II if S is the answer set of II’, that is, S = a(IIs). 
The effects of introducing integrity constraints and classical negation into a 
program appear in the second and third conditions of Definition 2.2. Intuitively 
speaking, each answer set is a possible set of beliefs: Each literal in an answer set 
can be considered to be true in the belief set. Because positive and negative literals 
have the same status, the result of negation by failure to prove an atom A does not 
mean that its negation --A is true. If an answer set contains neither A nor 1A,3 
the truth value of A is unknown in the belief set. Thus, the answer set semantics 
can provide for indefinite answers in answering queries, and such unknown 
information can be referred to in an extended logic program. 
If II is a general logic problem, i.e., a set of rules without classical negation, 
then the answer sets of II are identical to the stable models of II given by Gelfond 
and Lifschitz [lo], except that II may have the answer set Lit if no other answer 
set satisfies the integrity constraints in II. 
2.3. Consistency 
As explained in Section 1, the notion of consistency is important for extended logic 
programs and for theory formation. Here, we classify extended logic programs as 
follows. 
Definition 2.4. Let II be an extended logic program. 
(1) II is consistent if it has a consistent answer set. 
(2) II is contradictory if it has an inconsistent answer set. 
(3) II is incoherent if it has no answer set. 
We see that there are two kinds of inconsistency: contradiction (2) and inco- 
herency (3). The preceding definition is exclusive and complete: every program is 
either consistent, contradictory, or incoherent. This is verified by the following two 
observations. 
Proposition 2.$ (Minimality of answer sets [ll]). Let II be an extended logic program. 
ForanytwoanswersetsSandS’of II,ifScS’,thenS=S’. 
3This is a big difference from well-founded semantics [41] or stationary semantics 1341. We do not 
allow the inference that if A does not match the head of any rule of II in accordance with the default 
reasoning behind negation as failure, then put A into the false part. 
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Corollary 2.6. No extended logic program is both consistent and contradictory, and a 
contradictory program has the unique answer set Lit. 
Gelfond and Lifschitz [ll] show the relation between the answer sets of an 
extended logic program and the extensions of the corresponding Reiter default 
theory [36]. Every rule in an extended logic program II of the form 
L-+-L ,,..., L,,notL,+ ,,..., notL, 
can be identified with the default rule 
L, A *-. /\L,:ML,+,,...,Mz~ 
L 
where z] is the literal complementary to L: when A is an atom, A= 7A and 
7A = A. According to Gelfond and Lifschitz [ll], there is a l-l correspondence 
between the answer sets of II and the extensions of the default theory II. Thus, we 
can discuss the consistency of a program by means of its answer sets: A program 
has a consistent answer set if and only if the corresponding theory has a consistent 
extension. Note that a rule not containing not, 
L-L, ,..., L, or +L, ,..., L,, (3) 
can be identified with the default rule 
L, A ..* AL,: L, A --* AL,: 
or 
L false ’ (4) 
respectively, and that the rules without bodies in II can be represented by 
w,= ; (L+)En. 
t I 1 
Although the default rules of the form (4) are not excluded by Reiter’s definition, 
the existence of at least one justification for each default rule is presupposed in 
Reiter ([36] Corollary 2.2), which implies that a closed default theory II has an 
inconsistent extension if and only if W,, has an inconsistent extension.4 In this 
case, however, a default theory II may have an inconsistent extension even though 
the set of literals appearing in W,, is consistent. The precise characterization of 
contradictory programs can be given simply as follows. 
Proposition 2.7. An extended logic program II is contradictory if and only if the set of 
rules of the form (3) (i.e., the rules without not) in II is contradictory. 
PROOF. Lit is an answer set of II 
if and only if Lit is the answer set of IILi’ that is the set of rules obtained from II 
by deleting every rule containing a formula not L in its body (by Definition 2.3) 
if and only if IILir has an inconsistent answer set (by Definition 2.2). q 
4As far as the author knows, this observation for justification-free defaulr mules was first discussed by 
Brewka [2]. A default rule of the form (4) cannot be replaced with 
L, A .‘. AL,:Mtnle 
L 
because such a transformation would never produce inconsistent extensions. 
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Proposition 2.7 tells us that for a contradictory program, the inconsistent 
augmentation occurs only when the rules without negation as failure are inconsis- 
tent. On the other hand, we can see that the source of an incoherency always lies 
in a set of rules containing not in a program. These properties of inconsistencies 
will be taken into account when we characterize the consistent subsets of an 
inconsistent program for the transformation of our theory formation framework 
into a single extended logic program in Section 4. 
3. THEORY FORMATION 
In this section, we give a simple framework for hypothetical reasoning based on 
extended logic programs and its application to various forms of reasoning. The 
uniform framework we consider is based on a metatheoretical partition of knowl- 
edge. That is, when our whole knowledge is given as a set II of rules in an 
extended logic program, II is split into two parts CT, H) such that T U H = II and 
T f~ H = 0, where T stands for a set of facts and H stands for a set of candidate 
hypotheses that may be expected to be true. The resulting system is called a 
knowledge system. 
Definition 3.1. A knowledge system is a pair (T, H ), where T and H are extended 
logic programs. For a knowledge system K = (T, H), the set T is called the facts 
of K and the set H is called the (candidate) hypotheses of K. 
As explained in Section 1, the main task of a knowledge system is theory 
formation, that is, to find a subset E of H such that T U E is consistent. Here, we 
first characterize a condition under which a knowledge system can perform theory 
formation. 
Definition 3.2. Let K = (T, H) be a knowledge system. K is consistent if there is a 
set E c H such that T U E is consistent. K is contradictory if for any set E c H, 
T U E is contradictory. K is incoherent if K is neither consistent nor contradic- 
tory. 
Definition 3.2 says that theory formation can be achieved only by a consistent 
knowledge system. 
Proposition 3.3. Let K = (T, H) be a knowledge system. 
(1) K is contradictory if and only if T is contradictory. 
(2) If T is consistent, hen K is consistent. 
(3) Zf K is incoherent, hen T is incoherent. 
PROOF. 
(1) The only-if part is obvious from Definition 3.2. The if part is a direct 
consequence of Proposition 2.7. 
(2) Obvious from Definition 3.2 because E = 0 satisfies the condition. 
(3) We prove the contrapositive of the claim. Suppose that T is not incoherent, 
that is, T is either consistent or contradictory. If T is consistent, then K is 
consistent by (2). If T is contradictory, then K is contradictory by (1). In both 
cases, K is not incoherent. 0 
Proposition 3.3 tells us that a contradiction may not be removed by an addition 
of rules to the program. The converse directions of Proposition 3.3(2) and (3) do 
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not hold. Adding hypotheses to an incoherent program may make the knowledge 
system consistent. 
Example 3.4. Let us consider the knowledge system (T, H), where T = {P + not PI 
and H = {P + >. Although T is incoherent, T u H has a consistent answer set {PI. 
In the following subsections, we will consider formalizations for several kinds of 
common sense reasoning by using theory formation. 
3.1. Default Reasoning 
To augment an incomplete description of knowledge, one wants to represent and 
use “default” and “prototypic” knowledge. Default reasoning is thus one of the 
most obvious and important applications of theory formation, where default 
knowledge is taken into account unless there is evidence to the contrary. However, 
because default knowledge is usually inconsistent as a whole, simply adding all 
default knowledge to the background program would often result in no consistent 
answer set. To overcome this difficulty, we can deal with default knowledge as 
candidate hypotheses, and use them to augment the theory and to predict what we 
expect to be true. Then, as many hypotheses as possible are taken into account in 
an augmented set of beliefs. The notion of such an answer set of an augmented 
theory by a maximally consistent set of hypotheses roughly corresponds to a 
Theorist extension [31]. 
Definition 3.5. Let K = (T, H) be a knowledge system. An extension base of K is an 
answer set of T u E, where E is a maximal (with respect to set inclusion) subset 
of H such that T U E is consistent. 
For default reasoning, the task of a knowledge system is to get its extension 
bases. This framework can make a contradictory or incoherent program II become 
a consistent knowledge system (T, H) such that II = T u H, provided that proto- 
typic or typical knowledge is appropriately put into a set H of default hypotheses 
that is distinct from a set T of rules representing factual or exceptional knowledge. 
To obtain extension bases, some default hypotheses are allowed to be ignored, but 
no hypothesis can be dispensed with unless it is necessary to do so. 
Example 3.6. Suppose we have the knowledge system K = CT, H), where 
T= { TFZies(x) cPenguin(x), 
Bird(x) + Pengc&( x) , 
Bird( PO&) + , 
Penguin( TweeQ) + 17 
H= { Flies(x) +-Bird(x) }. 
Here it is easy to see that T u H is contradictory. The unique extension base of K 
is 
S = ( Bird( PO&), Perzguirz( Tweety) , 
Bird( Tweety) , FZies( Polly) , TFlies( Tweety)} . 
Notice that the hypothesis is used for x = PO& but is ignored for x = Tweety. 
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There are many issues addressed in default reasoning, such as multiple exten- 
sion problems and priorities of default knowledge. Thanks to the two connectives 
in logic programming, the nonmonotonic operator not and the constructive impli- 
cation +- , some of these topics are dealt with more naturally by our framework 
than by systems using first-order logic as a knowledge representation language.5 
We will not pursue these topics further because they are beyond the scope of this 
paper. Instead, we will show in the next two subsections that maximally consistent 
theories of knowledge systems can be used for providing the meanings of extended 
logic programs representing tasks other than default reasoning. 
3.2. Inconsistency Resolution 
Suppose that an extended logic program ll is inconsistent: either incoherent or 
contradictory. In this case, we cannot get any information on beliefs because either 
Il has no answer set or the answer set contains every literal. Instead of simply 
noticing that the program has bugs, we would like to have some conclusions about 
objects that are irrelevant to the inconsistency. Reasoning in the presence of 
inconsistency is thus often necessary in database systems or expert systems, and has 
been studied in the field of nonstandard logics in an attempt to restrict inferences 
from contradictions. The main difficulty here is that an incoherent program does 
not infer anything, so such a restriction does not work. That is why we need 
another approach to this problem. 
If II represents a finite set of rules, we may characterize maximally consistent 
subsets of II. If a belief is contained in an answer set of such a maximal subset, we 
conjecture that the belief may be true in a possible belief set of II if inconsisten- 
cies are removed. The idea of isolating inconsistencies is not a new one; for 
example, it can be seen in Rescher [38] for propositional logic. When there are 
multiple maximally consistent subsets of II, the user may be responsible for 
choosing one of them. More formally, for Il, we shall consider the knowledge 
system 
K= (0,rI). 
Each extension base of K can give the meaning of a result of reasoning (with 
inconsistency) from II. If LI is an incoherent program, then by considering the 
corresponding knowledge system K, for each source of incoherencies called 
odd-loops, a rule in the loop will be removed to obtain consistency. 
Example 3.7. Consider the knowledge system K = (0, rI> where II is given as 
P+notP, 
Q+notR, 
R +- not S. 
The unique extension base of K is {RI. No rules other than the first can be 
disregarded; any set of rules without either the second or third rule would remain 
incoherent unless the first rule was removed. 
‘Another feature of using + is that, whereas Poole’s [31] system needs constraints to prevent the 
use of contrapositives of clauses, they are not necessary for extended logic programs (see Kowalski and 
Sadri [22]). See also the difference between the hvo approaches with respect to naming hypotheses in 
Section 4.2. 
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If some of the rules of II are reliable and some are suspect, then of course we 
may have a knowledge system like K = (II,, II,>, where II, is knowledge that we 
are completely confident about and II, is knowledge that is less certain. We will 
discuss this issue later more generally in Section 6.6. 
Example 3.8 (Barber’s Paradox). Suppose that II is the extended logic program 
consisting of two rules: 
Shaves( Noel, x) +-notShaves(x,x), 
4haves( Casanova, Casanova) +- . 
This II is incoherent because the rule 
Shaves( Noel, Noel) + not Shaves( Noel, Noel) (5) 
is present in the program. Now, let K = (T, H) be a knowledge system where 
T = { -Shaves( Casanova, Casanova) + } , 
H= (Shaves(NoeZ,x) +notShaves(x,x)}. 
The hypothesis (5) is ignored in the unique extension base of K, 
{ 4haves( Casanova, Casanova), Shaves( Noel, Casanova)}. 
3.3. Closed World Assumption 
Another interesting application along the line of maximally consistent theory 
formation is the closed world assumption (CWA) [3.5]. For a ground atom A, it is 
very useful to define a CWA rule for A as a rule with the head -J in an extended 
logic program. For instance, Gelfond and Lifschitz [ll] define a (Reiter’s) CWA rule 
for each predicate P with n distinct variables x =x1, . . . , x, in the language as 
-lP(x) + not P(x). (6) 
Then, given a general logic program II, an extended logic program Kl U CW, where 
CW is the set of CWA rules (6) for all predicates, precisely characterizes the 
meaning of II within the stable model semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz [ill, 
Proposition 41. The CWA rules for all (or some) predicates in this case are 
consistent with any coherent general logic program. 
For extended logic programs, although an incomplete specification of knowledge 
often involves the open world assumption (OWA) for some predicates, we would 
like to consider the CWA for other predicates, as argued by Gelfond and Lifschitz. 
However, as shown in Section 1, if Reiter’s CWA rules (6) are used together with 
the OWA for an extended logic program, then the augmented program is not 
consistent in general. Thus, we should not assume all negative ground literals even 
if each of them can be consistently assumed. This problem is analogous to the 
application of the CWA for non-Horn clauses in a database, which may produce an 
inconsistent augmentation [35]. For a disjunctive database, Minker [26] proposes 
the generalized closed world assumption (GCWA), which derives +t for a ground 
atom A if A is true in no minimal model of the clauses. For an extended logic 
program, we should generalize the GCWA because the minimal models are not 
sufficient for characterizing the program.b In this case, however, we cannot simply 
‘For a different purpose, Gelfond [9] also generalizes the GCWA in the context of extended 
disjunctive databases [12]. See Section 6.5. 
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derive -4, even if no answer set of the program contains A. For example, 
although a program {Q +- -J’} has the unique answer set 0 in which neither P nor 
Q is contained, assuming both 7P and 7Q causes a contradiction. Therefore, we 
propose to test each ground atom A for membership in the extension bases of a 
knowledge system as follows. 
Definition 3.9. Let II be an extended logic program and let P 7 be a set of some 
CWA rules. We denote by CWA(II, P 1 1 the set of literals contained in every 
extension base of the knowledge system (II, P 1 >. We say a literal L is derived 
from II under the CWA rules P’ [denoted as CWA(n, P’> k Ll if L E 
CWA(rI, P’ 1. 
This definition preserves the consistency of an extended logic program when it is 
augmented with CWA rules. 
Proposition 3.10. Let II be a consistent extended logic program and let P 1 be a set of 
some CWA rules. Then CWA(lI, P 7 > is consistent. 
PROOF. Because II is consistent, each extension base S of (II, P 7 > is obviously 
consistent with II. Then, for any ground atom, A, S does not contain both A and 
4. Because CWA(II, P 7 > is the intersection of all extension bases, the result 
follows. 0 
We shall consider two kinds of specification of CWA rules P 7 for an extended 
logic program II. The first one is to use a knowledge system 
K, = (II,‘-‘), 
where CW is CWA rules (6) for some predicates. 
Example 3.12. Let the extended logic program II consist of the following three 
rules: 
Q+ if’(A), 
lQ+ +‘(B), 
f’(C) +f’(A),f’(B). 
And suppose that CW consists of the CWA rule for the predicate P: 
,P(x) *notP(x). 
It is easy to see that II U CW is incoherent. Now consider the knowledge system 
K, = (II, CW). There are two extension bases of K,: 
I lP(A), 3C)>Q) and {-P(B), q(C), TQ}. 
Because 7P(C> is contained in both extension bases, it holds that CWA(II, CW) k 
,P(C>. 
The second method is simpler than the first and uses a knowledge system 
K,=(II,NL), 
where NL is CWA rules of the form 
7P(x) + 
for some predicates with distinct variables x. 
(7) 
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Example 3.12. Let the extended logic program II consist of the following rules: 
P+notQ, 
Q+notR. 
II has the unique answer set S = {Q}. Now, suppose that NL contains three 
assertions, 
TP+-, 
1Q-, 
7R+. 
The unique extension base of the knowledge system K, = (II, NL) is 
In this case, II is a general logic program and the extension base S’ is the same as 
the answer set of the program II u CW, where CW is the Reiter’s CWA rules of 
the form (6). 
Proposition 3.13. Let II be a general logic program. Suppose that CW* is the CWA 
rule (6) for all predicates and that NL* is the rule (7) for all predicates. Then, the 
following three are equivalent. 
(1) S is a consistent answer set of II U CW ‘. 
(2) S is an extension base of the knowledge system (II,CW*). 
(3) S is an extension base of the knowledge system (II, NL*). 
PROOF. (1) =j (2). Because II U CW* is consistent by the supposition, obviously its 
answer set S is an extension base of (II,CW*>. 
(2) - (3). This is a special case of Proposition 4.4, which will be described in 
Section 4.1, where H,, and H, in Proposition 4.4 correspond to NL* and CW*, 
respectively. 
(3) = (1). Because II does not contain classical negation, it holds that II is 
consistent if (II, NL*) is consistent. Now, an extension base S of (II, NL*) can be 
represented by the set of literals consisting of the literals of a stable model S, of II 
together with the negative literals each of whose atom is not contained in S,,. By 
Gelfond and Lifschitz (1111 Proposition 41, this S is an answer set of II u CW*. 
0 
Note again that for an extended logic program II, Proposition 3.13 does not 
hold. The differences between the two knowledge systems, (II,CW) and (II, NL), 
appear in the next two examples, which show that (n,CW) is more appropriate for 
specifying the closed world assumption for extended logic programs. 
Example 3.14. Let us consider the following extended logic program II and two 
sets of hypotheses, CW and NL: 
II={ P+not TP}, 
CW={ TP+notP], NL={ ~Ptj. 
There are two extension bases of K, = (II, CW): S1 = {PI and S, = 1 ,P). Hence, 
CWA(II,CW) # TP. However, only S, is the unique extension base of K,, = 
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(II, NL); thus CW/l(fI, NL) k TP. Thus, (II, NL) makes as many negative literals 
hold as possible, whereas (fI,CIV) preserves the semantics of II in a possible 
belief set. Obviously, TP should not be derived under the CWA because the 
unique answer set of fI contains P. 
Example 3.15. Suppose that II, CW and NL are given as 
rI= {P+not 7P, 
+ ,P,,Q 1, 
CW= ( 7P+notP, 
lQ+notQ), 
NL={ TP+, 
TQ-1. 
There is only one extension base of K, = (n,CW): S, = {P, TQ}, which is the 
unique answer set of II U CW. Hence, CWA(n,CW) k TQ. However, unlike the 
previous example, K, = (fI, NL) obtains an extra extension base in this case: 
S, = {TP). Therefore, CWA(KI, NL) t+ TQ. Because the unique answer set of fI is 
{P} and thus TP should not be derived under the CWA, we would not have any 
reason to reject the assumption about 7Q. 
Proposition 3.16. Let n be a consistent extended logic program, CW a set of CWA 
rules (6), and A any ground atom such that the rule -TA +- not A is in CW. If A is 
in some answer set of IT, then CWA(n, CW) k+ -4. 
PROOF. Suppose that CWAOI, CW) k 7A. Let S be any extension base of (II, CW) 
and let E be a maximal subset of CW such that S is an answer set of El U E. By 
the definition of CWAUI, CW), S contains 4 and thus does not contain A. Then, 
the CWA rule (*> is in E. Now, assume that there exists an answer set S’ of II 
such that S’ contains A. Then, adding the CWA rule ( *) to fI does not prevent A 
from being in an answer set of the augmented program. Therefore, the CWA rule 
(*> cannot be in E, contradiction. Hence, no answer set of II contains A, and the 
result follows. 0 
Proposition 3.16 shows that the knowledge system (n,CW) agrees with our 
intuition of the closed world assumption for extended logic programs. 
3.4. Abduction 
Theory formation was originally motivated by the goal of providing a formal 
account of inference to the best explanation of observations. This inference has 
been known as abduction, which plays a fundamental role in common sense 
reasoning such as diagnosis, synthesis, intelligent databases, sophisticated user 
interfaces, and communication among intelligent agents. Also, as argued by Kowal- 
ski [21], abduction will be one of the major promising extensions of logic program- 
ming. For abduction, a knowledge system can be used to find an explanation E of a 
given formula 0 as follows. 
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Definition 3.17. Let K = CT, HI be a knowledge system and let 0 be a formula. A 
set E c H is an explanation of 0 (with respect o K) if: 
1. T U E is consistent, and 
2. 0 is derived from T u E. 
Although the first condition is clear, the meaning of the second condition is 
somewhat controversial. It may be expressed in either of the following: 
(a) There is an answer set T U E that satisfies 0. 
(b) 0 is satisfied by every answer set of TUE. 
Here, we assume that 0 is simply a conjunction of literals, and we say that 0 is 
satisfied by a set S G Lit if every literal in 0 is contained in S? We write E 
explains, 0 if E is an explanation of 0 in the sense of the first definition of 
derivability (a), and write E explains, 0 if E is an explanation of 0 in the sense 
of the second definition of derivability (b). 
Unlike Poole’s [31] system, semimonotonicity [36] does not hold even if either all 
candidate hypotheses in a knowledge system are rules without bodies or they can 
be identified with Reiter’s normal default rule L +-L,, . . . , L,, not 7L. In other 
words, for two knowledge systems K = CT, H) and K’ = (T, H’) such that H’ c H, 
the fact that S’ is an extension base of K’ does not imply that there is an extension 
base S of K such that S’ c S. This is because the rules T can be identified with 
Reiter’s nonnormal default rules. 
Example 3.18. Let K = (T, HI and K’ = CT, H’) be two knowledge systems where 
T={ P+B, 
Q -+A, notP, 
P+A, note }, 
H={ A+, 
B+ )7 
H’={ A+ ). 
K’ has two extension bases: S, = {A, Q] and S, = {A, P). Clearly H’ G H. How- 
ever, S, is not a subset of the unique extension base of K: S = {A, B, P}. 
From the preceding discussion, the fact that a formula has an explanation does 
not imply that the formula is satisfied by an extension base. That is, explicability 
and membership in an extension differ for knowledge systems. In this sense, 
default reasoning is clearly distinguished from abduction. In default reasoning, a 
set H of hypotheses is used as defaults, whereas in abduction it is used as premises. 
If H represents a set of defaults, then an explanation is acceptable only when it is 
included in a maximal subset E of H such that T u E is consistent. In other words: 
7We can reduce the restriction that an explained formula 0 is a conjunction of literals. If 0 is any 
formula, then we can regard it as an integrity constraint (like [37]) so that it should be satisfied by an 
answer set. Because this integrity constraint can be transformed into a rule + not 0 (see Section 2.2), 
its satisfaction can be checked by finding an answer set of the extended logic program with such rules. 
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Definition 3.19. Let K = CT, H) be a knowledge system and let 0 be a formula. 
Assume that H represents a set of defaults. A set E c Hpredicts 0 (with respect 
to 
1. 
2. 
K) if: 
E explains, 0, and 
there is a set E’ 2 E satisfying the conditions: 
(a) E’ is a maximal subset of H such that T U E’ is consistent and 
(b) 0 is derived from T U E. 
For the condition (21, if E’ explains, 0, then we write Epredicts, 0; else (that is, 
if E’ explains, 0) we write E predicts, 0. 
Example 3.20. Let K = CT, H) be the same knowledge system as Example 3.18, that 
is, 
T={ P+--B, 
Q+-A, notP, 
P+A,notQ }, 
H={ A+, 
B+ 17 
1. E, = {A t}. T U E, has two answer sets: S, = {A, Q} and S, = {A, P}. 
E, explains, both Q and P, but cannot explain, PA Q. 
E, explains, neither Q nor P. 
2. E, = {B t}. T U E, has the unique answer set: S, = {B, P}. 
E, explains, and explains, P. 
3. H = E, U E,. K has the unique extension base: S = (A, B, PI. 
H explains, and explains, P. 
4. Each of E,, E,, and H predicts, and predicts, P. 
Q can be neither predicted, nor predicted, by any set of hypotheses. 
If we follow the first definition of derivability, Q has an explanation E, because S, 
contains Q. However, because S, is not a subset of the unique extension base S of 
K, Q does not hold in an extension. Notice that in this case E, can also explain P 
because S, contains P. It is curious that P A Q cannot be explained by E, whereas 
E, can explain both P and Q. 
If we use the second definition of derivability, Q can never be explained with 
respect to K because S, does not satisfy Q. In this case, P cannot be explained by 
E, either, but P can be explained by either E, or H. 
Because T U H is consistent, if H represents default knowledge, then P can be 
predicted, but Q cannot be predicted, whichever definition of derivability we 
choose. 
4. REDUCTION TO EXTENDED LOGIC PROGRAMS 
In this section, we will show a method of the transformation from any knowledge 
system K = (T, H) to a single extended logic program K* such that every consis- 
tent answer set of T U E for any E 5 H can be characterized by an answer set of 
K*, and vice versa. Also, the extension bases of K will be shown to correspond to 
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the set of answer sets of K* with some property. Moreover, we will show in Section 
5 that this program K* can be further reduced to a general logic program with 
integrity constraints, In other words, we will show that there is a l-l correspon- 
dence between the semantics of knowledge systems and the stable model semantics 
of their transformed general logic programs. Thus, the transformation method we 
present has the advantage that it gives an easy way to understand the semantics of 
knowledge systems: Because the disjoint set of candidate hypotheses (and classical 
negation) are eliminated in the process of transformation, we can apply the answer 
set (or stable model) semantics to the resulting extended (or general1 logic 
program. 
Recall that even if a program B is incoherent, an augmented program lI’ 2 II 
may be consistent (see Example 3.4). Thus, for a set E G H such that T U E is 
incoherent, we cannot prune the supersets of E in 2N to find an extension base of 
K. This fact makes the design and implementation of knowledge systems very 
difficult. To overcome this difficulty, we can use the characterization of all 
consistent answer sets of T U E for any E c N by analyzing the single program K*. 
Therefore, another advantage of the transformational approach is that, in order to 
compute knowledge systems, we do not need any extra mechanism: Any procedure 
based on the answer set (or stable model) semantics can be directly used for the 
transformed program. 
We require three steps for the translation to K*. To begin with, we will examine 
a knowledge system K, = (T, H,) such that HO is a set of rules without bodies 
(Section 4.1). The first transformation is performed from K, to a knowledge 
system K, = (T, H,) such that K, is not contradictory unless T is contradictory. 
Then, the second translation constructs the target extended logic program K* such 
that K* is consistent under a certain condition. Next, in Section 4.2, we will 
describe the third translation from any knowledge system K = (T, H) to the simple 
knowledge system in the form considered in Section 4.1, and then the three 
transformations will be finally combined. 
In the following, for an extended logic program B not containing integrity 
constraints (21, we denote the heads of the rules of II as 
Head(n)=(LI(LcL,,...,L,,notL,+,,...,nolL,)En}, 
and the literals complementary to the heads of rules in II as 
Head(n) = {I I (L + L,, . . . , L,, not L, + ,, . . . , not L,) E n}. 
4. I. Simple Candidate Hypotheses 
We first consider a simple knowledge system each of whose hypotheses is in the 
form of an assertion of a ground literal 
L+-. (8) 
Because positive and negative literals are dealt with symmetrically in extended 
logic programs, we have no reason to restrict the simplest form of hypotheses to 
being positive. Let us consider a knowledge system K, = (T, H,,>, where HO is a set 
of rules of the form (8). We will translate K, to a noncontradictory program and 
then to a consistent program. 
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Adding all literal assertions in H, to the program T would result in a 
contradictory or incoherent program. For example, when H, is contradictory, 
T U HO must be contradictory by Proposition 2.7. To remove contradictions, we can 
simply block the application of a hypothesis (8) if it happens that z is derived, by 
adding a formula not z to its body. Now let K, = (T, H,) be the knowledge system 
obtained from K, = (T, H,) by replacing each rule in HO of the form (8) with a 
rule in H, of the form 
L +notz. (9) 
Then, T U H, is not contradictory unless T is,contradictory. This is because H, 
does not contain a rule without not, so that the following property can be shown to 
hold by Proposition 2.7. 
Proposition 4.1. Let K, = CT, H,) and K, = (T, H,) be two knowledge systems as 
above. K, is contradictory if and only if T U H, is contradictory, which is then 
contradictory if and only if T is contradictory. 
Notice that T U H, may be incoherent even if K, is consistent. Before we 
proceed further to remove incoherencies, let us consider the case that T U H, is 
consistent. Now, to characterize the extension bases of knowledge systems, we 
introduce the following definition. 
Dejinition 4.2. Let LI and H be two extended logic programs. A consistent answer 
set S of II is H-maximal if there is no consistent answer set S’ of II such that 
SnHead(H) CS’nHead(H). 
For a knowledge system K = (T, H), the distinction between the H-maximal@ 
of an answer set and an extension base of K is important. When T U H is 
consistent, because no hypothesis is ignored, any answer set of T U H is an 
extension base of K, but it may not be an H-maximal answer set of T U H. On the 
other hand, when S is an H-maximal answer set of T U E for some set E G H, it 
may not be an extension base of K. In an H-maximal answer set, the hypotheses in 
a maximal subset of H are used in practice, whereas in an extension base, the 
hypotheses just take part in a maxima1 subset of H, but some of them may be 
canceled so that their heads are not contained in the extension base. 
Example 4.3. Suppose that we are given the knowledge system K = CT, HI, where 
T = {P + not ,P} and H = {TP + not P}. Although both S, = {P) and S, = { ,P} 
are extension bases of K (in fact, they are the answer sets of T U HI, only S, is an 
H-maximal answer set of T U H. 
For the first translation, the next proposition holds. 
Proposition 4.4. Let K, = (T, H,) and K, = CT, H,) be two knowledge systems as 
above. Suppose that T U H, is consistent. If S is an H,-maximal answer set of 
T U H,, then S is an extension base of K,. 
HYPOTHETICAL REASONING IN LOGIC PROGRAMS 209 
PROOF. We first prove that if S is an answer set of T u H,, then S is an answer set 
of T U Hf. Suppose that S is an answer set of T U H,. Because 
H,S={L+((L +notZ) EH~,~ &S] 
=((L+EH~IZGCSS)GH~ 
and S = cu((T U H,)s) = a((T U Hf)s), S is an answer set of T U Hf. 
Now, suppose that S is an HI-maximal answer set of T U H,. Suppose also to 
the contrary that S is not an extension base of K,. Then there exists a set E, 
(Hf c E, c H,) such that T U E, is consistent. Let S’ be an answer set of T U E,,. 
By H; c E, c H;‘, clearly it holds that S f’ Head c S’ fl Head( contradict- 
ing the H,-maximality of S. 0 
The converse of Proposition 4.4 does not hold: There is an extension base of 
K, = (T, H,,) that is not an HI-maximal answer set of T U H, [suppose a case that 
an extension base S contains neither L nor z for a literal L E Head(H 
Moreover, it cannot give every consistent answer set of T U E, for any set E, c Ho, 
which may be used for abduction. 
Example 4.5. Let us consider the knowledge system K, = CT, H,) and its translated 
knowledge system K, = (T, H,), where 
T={ TP+notP, 
Q- 19 
H, ={ P+not TP, 
K, has two extension bases: S, = {P} and S, = 1 lP, Ql. However, S, is the unique 
answer set of T u H,. In S,, neither Q nor 7Q holds. Note also that there is an 
answer set of T = T U 0: S, = ( TP), which cannot be obtained from the answer 
sets of T U H,. 
Another difficulty of Proposition 4.4 is that the consistency assumption for 
T U H, is indispensable. For example, we have seen in Section 1 and in Example 
3.11 that an extended logic program with the CWA may be incoherent, but the 
corresponding knowledge system may have extension bases. Therefore, adding all 
hypotheses (L + not L) in H, to the program T would result in an incoherent 
program even if T is consistent. Thus our next target is to remoue incoherencies. In 
the following translation, we will characterize all consistent answer sets of T u E, 
for any set E, _C H,, as well as each extension base of K,. The next lemma gives the 
background for the translation. 
Lemma 4.6. Let T be a noncontradictory extended logic program and let E, be a set of 
rules of the form (9). Zf T U E, has an answer set S, then for each rule in E, with 
the head L, S contains either L or z but not both of them. 
210 K. INOUE 
PROOF. By Proposition 4.1, T U E, is not contradictory and hence S does not 
contain both L and z. If S does not contain z, then by (L + not z> E E,, 
(T u E,)’ contains (L +> and so L E CX((T U E1>s> =S. If S does not contain L, 
then z must be contained in S because if z C?Z S, then L E S holds by the same 
argument as above contradicting L G S. 0 
The basic idea of the next translation is that we expand each incomplete 
extension base S of K, = (T, HO> by adding the extra literal z for each literal 
L E Head such that L is undefined in S. The augmented set of literals 
contains either L or 1 for each L E Head and is an answer set of T U H, U H, 
(H, is the added hypotheses) by Lemma 4.6. 
Now, for each rule in H, of the form (91, 
L +notZ, 
we shall consider the hypothesis of the opposite form: 
Z +-notL. 
For H,, we denote the set of opposite hypotheses of the form (10) as 
H,={Z*notLILEHead(H,)}. 
The result of the second translation is the extended logic program 
K*=TuH,uH,. 
(10) 
Furthermore, for knowledge systems K, = CT, H,) and K, = CT, H,), we shall 
impose the following restriction on the syntax of T (this restriction will be removed 
completely in Section 4.2): 
Forany(L+)EHO(or(L+notz)EH,), 
every rule in T does not contain L in its head 
and contains neither z nor not z in its body. 
(11) 
Example 4.7. Assume that the rule 
l&q x) + notAb 
is a hypothesis in H. Then the following rules satisfy the condition (11): 
Flies(x) +-Bird(x), +Ib(x), 
Ab( x) +- Ostrich(x), 
+Xes( x) + not +Ib( x) , 
whereas the next three rules do not: 
Flies(x) +Bird(x),notAb(x), 
l&(x) +-Canary(x), 
-Flies(x) +Ab( x) . 
The next theorem is the main result of the second translation. 
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Theorem 4.8. Let K, = (T, H,) be a knowledge Jystem such that H, is a set of rules of 
the form (9) and T satisfies the condition (11). If S is a consistent answer set of 
T U E,, where E, is a subset of H,, then 
S’=SuHead(H,\E,) (12) 
is a consistent answer set of K *. Moreover, every consistent answer set of K * can be 
represented in the form (12), where S is a consistent answer set of T U E, for some 
set E, C-H,. 
PROOF. Let S be a consistent answer set of T U E, (E, c H,). Because no 
literal L E Head appears in the head of any rule in T, for any literal L E 
Head(H,\E,), it holds that L 4 S. Therefore, S’ is consistent. By Lemma 4.6, 
Head c S and (Head(E,>\Head(Ef>) CS. Then it follows that 
Head (Ef) c S’ 
and 
Head(~,\E,)u(Head(~,)\Head(E~))=(Head(~,)\Head(~~))cs’. 
Because no rule in T contains not z for any z E Head in its body, it holds 
that TS’ = T” and 
Hf’ = {L 6 ( L E Head( Es)} = Ef. 
Now 
a((K*)“) = a(TS’ uH;’ up;‘) 
= cx(T’UEfU{ZtlLE(Head(H,)\Head(Ef))}) 
=n((TUE,)‘)U(Head(H,)\Head(Ef)) 
[because no rule in T contains any z E Head( H,) in its body] 
=SuHead(H,\E,) [by( Head /Head( CS] 
= S’. 
Hence, S’ is a consistent answer set of K*. 
To prove the second claim, take any answer set S’ of K* and define 
E,={(L+rzot~)~H, ILES’}. 
Clearly, E, cH, and Hf’ = {L + I L E Head( = Ef’. Then 
S’=~((TUH,UH,)~‘) 
= a(TS’ ‘J Hf’ u f?;‘) 
= cx(T” u Es’ u {z +--ILEH~~~(H~\E,)}) 
= cx(TS’UEf’)UHead(H,\EI). 
Now let S = a(T” U Es’). Because S’ = S U Head(H, \E,), it holds that 
TS’ = TS and Es’ = Es by the condition (11). Therefore, S = a(TS U Es) = 
a((T u E,)‘). q 
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Exumple 4.9. Let us verify Theorem 4.8 in the example of the CWA introduced in 
Section 1. Let K, = (T, H,) be the knowledge system, where 
T=( Q+ ,P(A), ,P(B), 
lQ+- L 
H, = { 7P(x) +notP(x) }. 
In this case, H,= {P(x) + not 9(x>}. There are three answer sets of T U H, U H,: 
S; = { 4%4), P(B), 7Q>, Sk = {PL4), -J’(B), T&I, and S; = {P(A), P(B), TQI. 
By using the translation in the proof of the second claim of Theorem 4.8, we get 
the three corresponding answer sets: 
S, = { -P(A), TQ} for TU { -#(A) +notP(A)), 
S,= { 3(B), 7Q) for TU { ,P(B) en&P(B)}, 
S, = 1 TQ} for TUT= T. 
The next two properties characterize the knowledge system K, with simple 
hypotheses by the translated program K*. These are the final results of this 
subsection. 
Corolluly 4.10. Let K, = (T, H,) be a knowledge system such that H, is a set of 
rules of the form (8) and T satisfies the condition (11). If S is a consistent 
answer set of T U E, for some E, c H,, then 
S’=SUHead(H,,\E,) (13) 
is a consistent answer set of K*. Moreover, every consistent answer set of K* 
can be represented in the form (13), where S is a consistent answer set of 
T U E, for some set E, C H,. 
PROOF. The first claim can be proved in a similar way to Theorem 4.8. To prove 
the second claim, for any answer set S’ of K*, we can define E, = {(L +) E H,, I L 
E S’} and use the same argument as the previous proof. q 
Theorem 4.11. Let K, = (T, H,,) be the same knowledge system as in Corollary 4.10. 
If S is an extension base of K,, then 
S’=SuHead(H,\E,,), whereE,={(L+)EHOILES} (14) 
is an H,-maximal answer set of K *. Moreover, every H,-maximal answer set of K* 
can be represented in the form (14), where S is an extension base of K,. 
PROOF. Suppose that S is an extension base of K,. Then S is an answer set of 
T U E, because Head E S. By Corollary 4.10, S’ is a consistent answer set of 
K*. Suppose to the contrary that S’ is not an Ho-maximal answer set of K*. Then 
there is an answer set S” of K* such that S’ n Head CS” fl Head( 
Because E,={(L+)EH~ILES}={(L+)~H,,ILES’), it holds that &,c 
{(L t) E H, ) L E S”}. This contradicts the maximal@ of E, in 2Ho. Hence, S’ is 
an Ho-maximal answer set of K *. 
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Now, we prove the second claim. Suppose that S’ is an Ho-maximal answer set 
of K*. By Corollary 4.10, S’ can be represented by S’ = S U Head(H,\&), where 
SisananswersetofTUE,andE,={(Lt)EH,(LES’)=((Lc)EHo(LE 
S). Suppose to the contrary that S is not an extension base of K,. Then there is a 
set F (E, c F cH,,) such that T u F is consistent. Let R be an answer set of 
T U F. By Corollary 4.10, R’ = R U Head(H\F) is an answer set of K*. By E, C F, 
clearly Head(E,,)CHead(F)G R. Therefore, S’ fl Head( CR f' Head(Ho)L R’ 
fl Head( This contradicts the H,-maximality of S’. I7 
Example 4.12. Let us consider the knowledge system K, = CT, HO), which is the - 
same as Example 4.5, and the translated sets of hypotheses, H, and H,: 
T= { TP+notP, 
+p,Q L 
HO={ P+, 
Q+ 1, 
H, =( P-not TP, 
Q+not lQ}> 
- 
HI = { 7P + not P, 
TQ+notQ }. 
There are three answer sets of K* = T U H U f?: S; = (P, TQ}, S; = { lP, Q}, and 
S; = { TP, TQ}. Of these, S; and S; are two H,,-maximal answer sets of K*, and 
they correspond to the expansions of the two extension bases of K,: S, = {P} and 
S, = ( TP, Q}. Note that S; is the expansion of the answer set of T: S, = { ,P}. 
4.2. Complex Candidate Hypotheses 
In the last subsection, we considered a knowledge system K = (T, H) where H is 
restricted to being either a set of rules of the form (8) or a set of rules of the form 
(9). Moreover, we considered only the case where a set of rules T satisfies the 
condition (11). In this subsection, we remove all of these restrictions: We allow any 
extended logic program for both T and H. 
Example 4.13. Let us first consider the case in which T does not satisfy the 
condition (11) for K = CT, HI, where H is a set of hypotheses of the form (9). 
Suppose that K is the following knowledge system: 
T={ Q+P, 
Q- TP, 
-Q+- 19 
H=( -lP+notP }. 
K does not satisfy the condition (11) because P appears in the body of the first rule 
of T. It is easy to see that K has the unique extension base S = ( TQ}, which is the 
only answer set of T. However, when we introduce the opposite hypothesis, 
214 K. INOUE 
g = {P + not -J’}, we see that the program T U H U H is incoherent. Thus Theo- 
rem 4.8 cannot be used in this case. This is because neither P nor 7P can be 
consistently added to T, but introducing g forces the answer set to include either 
of them by Lemma 4.6. 
We shall translate any knowledge system K to an extended logic program K*. 
The basic idea is “naming hypotheses” and is similar to Poole [31]. After the 
translation, we can use the results for simple hypotheses presented in the last 
subsection. 
Now let K = (T, H) be any knowledge system. For each rule C E H, we shall 
associate a propositional symbol S, that does not appear elsewhere in K.8 For any 
subset E of H, we define the following sets of rules: 
A,(E) = {S,+ICEE}, 
A(E)={6c+not~6cIC~E}, 
x(E) ={++not 8, ICEE}, 
I-(E)=(L+&,L, ,..., L,,notL,+ ,I..., notL,IC 
=(L+L, ,..., L,,notL,+, ,..., notL,) EE) 
U{+Sc,L ,,..., L,,notL,+, )...) notL,IC 
=(+L1 ,..., L,,notL,+, ,..., notL,)~E}. 
For K = (T, H), we define the extended logic program K* as 
K*=TuI’(H)uA(H)uE(H). 
Before analyzing the program K*, let us first consider a knowledge system 
K,=(Tur(H),A,(H)). 
This knowledge system has only an atomic form of hypotheses and satisfies the 
condition (11) because no 6, E Head(A,&H)) appears in any rule other than in the 
body of one rule in r(H)? Therefore, we can apply Corollary 4.10 and Theorem 
4.11 for K,. 
The basic property of the translation is shown by the next theorem. 
Theorem 4.14. Let K = (T, H) be any knowledge system and let E be a subset of H. 
S is a consistent answer set of T U E if and only if 
S’ = S U Head( A,( E)) 
is a consistent answer set of T U I?(E) U A,(E). 
PROOF. Suppose that S is an answer set of T U E. Then S’ is obviously consistent. 
It is easy to see that the knowledge system (T u r(E), A,(E)) satisfies the condi- 
*If a hypothesis C contains n distinct free variables x =x1,. . , x,, then we can name C with S,(x), 
where 6, is an n-ary predicate symbol appearing nowhere in K. Note that every variable appearing in a 
rule is a free variable in our language. 
9We can allow T to include rules containing 6, E Head(As(H)) within the restriction (11). Because 
these rules are not necessary for our purpose, we do not pursue this possibility further (see also 
Example 4.19). 
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tion (11) Therefore, 7”’ = TS because S’ does not contain any new literal other 
than the’ names of hypotheses of E. Similarly, r(E)” = lXE>s and A,(E)” = 
A,(E) = (6, +- I C E El. Now 
,((‘I-u T(E) u A”(W) 
= a(Ts u f’(@ u A,(E)) 
=~~(T~u(~~+ICEE}U{L+L~,...,L,I 
(L-L ,,..., L,,notL,+, ,..., rzotL,)~:E,L,+~ I..., L,W]) 
[by unfolding the rules of I?( E)S by A,(E)] 
= a(TS uES u A,,(E)) 
=cK((TUE)~) UHead(A,(i?)) 
=SUHead(A,(E)) [bySnHead(A,(E))=CZ] 
= S'. 
Hence, S’ is a consistent answer set of T U IYE) U A,(E). 
On the other hand, suppose that S’ is a consistent answer set of T U I’(E) U 
A,(E). Because S f? Head(Ao(E)) = 0, we can immediately identify S from S’. By 
using the same translation as above, we see that 
S’ = a(Ts’ U r(qS’ U A,(E)~‘) 
= a(Ts uES U AO(E)) 
=a((T U E)s) U Head(A,(E)). 
Because a((T U E>‘) n Head(Ao(E>> = 0, it holds that S = a((T U E)?. Hence, S 
is an answer set of TUE. Cl 
By combining Theorem 4.14 and CoroIIary 4.10, we get the following result. 
Every answer set of any consistent heory from K = (T, H) can be characterized by 
an answer set of K* = T U T(H) U A(H) U x(H), and vice versa. 
Corollary 4.15. Let K = (T, H) be any knowledge system. If S is a consistent answer 
set of T U E, where E is a subsef of H, fhen 
S'=SUHead(A,(E))UHead(A,(N\E)) (15) 
is a consistent answer set of K *. Moreover, every consistent answer set S’ of K * can 
be represented in the form (15) where S is a consistenf answer set of T u E for some 
sef EGH. 
Corollary 4.15 shows that for (I”, H) if T U E (E G H) has a consistent answer 
set S, then 6, can be consistently added to S for every hypothesis C in E and the 
negated names of all other hypotheses can be also added to S, and that we can find 
these answer sets of the consistent heories from (T, H) by removing all of positive 
and negative naming hypotheses from the answer sets of K*. 
Finally, we can characterize the extension bases of K = (T, H) by combining 
Theorem 4.11, Theorem 4.14, and Corollary 4.15. 
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Corollary 4.16. Let K = (T, H) be any knowledge system. If S is an extension base of 
K, that is, an answer set of T U E for a maximal subset E of H such that T U E is 
consistent. then 
S’ = S U Head( Ao( E)) U Head( A,( H\E)) 
is a A,(H)-maximal answer set of K*. 
Conversely, if S ’ is a A,( H )-maximal answer set of K *, then 
S=S’\(Head(A,(H))UHead(AO(H))) 
is an extension base of K. 
Example 4.17. Let K = (T, H) be the knowledge system introduced in Example 
4.13: 
T=( Q-P, 
Q- -, 
-Q+ 1, 
H={ TP+--notP }. 
Now, we can name the hypothesis as follows: 
A,(H) =h+no,~+~ 
r(H) = (lP+ 87Ptno,P, notPI. 
Recall that K has the unique extension base S = ( TQ}. It is easy to check that 
S’=SU~~~_PtnotP1 is the unique answer set of K* = TU I’(H)U A(H)U 
A(H). 
Example 4.18. Let us see how we can restore the consistency of an incoherent 
program II. We construct the knowledge system (0, II) according to Section 3.2 
and apply the reduction techniques. For example, consider the knowledge system 
K = (0, IYI>, where 
II={P+notP}. 
In this case, S = 0 is the unique expression base of K. Now 
A,(n) = {&tnot~+}, 
r(n) = {P+ &tnorP, notPI. 
The unique answer set of K* is 
HYPOTHETICAL REASONING IN LOGIC PROGRAMS 217 
Example 
3.6: 
T={ 
H={ 
4.19. Consider the knowledge system K = CT, H) introduced in Example 
7Flies( x) + Penguin(x) , 
Bird(x) + Penguin(~) , 
Bird( PO&) +- ) 
Penguin ( Tweety ) +- 13 
Flies(x) + Bird(x) 1. 
In this case, we can name the hypothesis as follows. 
A,,(H) = {Birdflies +}, 
I’(H) = {Flies(x) +- Birdfies( x), Bird(x)} . 
Then, we see that there is the unique A,(H)-maximal answer set of K*: 
S’ = { Bird( Polly) , Penguin( Tweety) , Bird( Tweety) , Flies( PO&), 
BirdJlies( PO&), TFlies( Tweety ) , TBirdflies( Tweety )} . 
Removing all the naming literals from S’, we get the unique extension base S of 
K: 
S = { Bird( PO&), Penguin( Tweety) , 
Bird( Tweety), Flies( PO&), TFZies( Tweety)} . 
The difference between Poole’s system and ours with respect to the naming is that 
the naming in Poole [31] has the effect of introducing normal default rules, for 
example, 
:MBird( x) 3 Fhes( x) 
Bird(x) 3 FZies( x) ’ 
where 3 is classical implication. This default rule causes 
from TFZies(Sam) we can conclude TBird(Sam) (this 
because we do not know the reason for Sam’s inability 
unintended side effects: 
should not be allowed 
to fly; Sam might be a ,. 
penguin). To prevent such an inference, we must add a fact like ( TFliesCx) 3 
TBirdflies(x>>. However, this clause further causes another side effect: From the 
hypothesis Birdflies(Paz.4 and the contrapositive of ( TFlies(x) 3 TBirdfties(x>>, we 
can conclude Flies(Pau1). To prevent the last inference, we must use this fact as a 
constraint. In our case, both kinds of pruning rules are unnecessary. 
5. REDUCTION TO GENERAL LOGIC PROGRAMS 
The question now is how to compute the proposed framework for theory forma- 
tion. Because we have seen that every knowledge system can be transformed to a 
single extended logic program, we can use methods to compute answer sets of 
extended logic programs. For this purpose, Gelfond and Lifschitz [ll] show how to 
reduce an extended logic program to a general logic program. The method is to 
replace every classical negation in a program II with a new propositional symbol, 
for example, 1A is replaced by A’. We call the resulting general logic program 
(denoted as n’) the positive form of II. However, even if the original extended 
logic program is incoherent, its positive form may have stable models. 
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Example 5.1. Let II be the extended logic program shown in the example of the 
CWA in Section 1, and II+ its positive form: 
II={ 
II+={ 
Q+- lP(A), Q(B), 
1Q-Y 
-3(x) +notP(x) }, 
Q+P<A)',f'(B)', 
Q'+, 
P(x)’ tnotP(x) 1. 
Whereas II is incoherent, II+ has a stable model {P(A)‘, P(B)‘, Q, Q’}. 
Note that not every incoherent program may be translated to a general logic 
program that has inconsistent stable models; it may remain incoherent (for 
example, H = {P * mt I’)). Conversely, not every translated general program that 
has inconsistent stable models may correspond to an incoherent extended logic 
program; it may be translated from a contradictory program (for example, II+ = 
{P +- , P’ * 1). Anyway, we need a mechanism to check whether the resulting 
stable models have a pair of complementary propositions, say A and A’. To discard 
each stable model possessing a pair, we can represent pruning rules as integrity 
constraints (i.e., rules with no heads). For example, for each atom A such that both 
positive and negative literals appear in the program, we may add an extra integrity 
constraint: 
+A, A’. (16) 
Proposition 5.2. Let II be any extended logic program, let IIr be the set of rules not 
containing not in TI, and let II” (II,+*) be the g eneral logic program consisting of 
all rules of the positive form of n (III,) together with all integrity constraints (16) 
for all ground atoms A. 
(I) lI is consistent if and only if H+* is consistent. Furthermore, every stable 
model St of rII+ corresponds to an answer set S of II, and vice versa. 
(2) II is contradictory if and only if II;* is contradictory. 
(3) II is incoherent if and only if II:* is not contradictory and II+* is not 
consistent. 
PROOF. (1) is a direct consequence of Gelfond and Lifschitz ((111, Proposition 21, 
which shows that Il is consistent if and only if HI+ has a consistent stable model. 
For the proof of (2) and (31, we can identify whether an inconsistent program Il is 
contradictory or incoherent by Proposition 2.7, and the results follow. 0 
By using Proposition 5.2, we can use any proof procedure for computing 
hypothetical reasoning proposed in this paper. An abductive proof procedure for 
the stable model semantics of general logic programs is proposed by Eshghi and 
Kowalski 171 for call-consistent programs. Procedures to compute stable models 
satisfying integrity constraints have been proposed by Satoh and Iwayama [40] 
using a TMS-like bottom-up manner and by Inoue, Koshimura, and Haszgawa 1171 
using a model-generation theorem prover. 
Alternative methods to compute the theory formation framework can be envi- 
sioned. Because we have seen that every rule in H of a knowledge system 
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K = (T, H) can be transformed to the unique naming hypothesis, we can use 
nonmonotonic ATM,!& (Dressier [5]; Junker [18]) to compute explanations of each 
atom. The consistency maintenance is then performed by pruning each set of 
hypotheses ubsumed by a minimal nogood. 
6. DISCUSSION 
In this section, we compare the proposed framework to other hypothetical reason- 
ing systems based on logic programming. Especially here we see how a lot of 
previous proposals for default and abductive reasoning as well as contradiction 
removals in the field of logic programming can be explained uniformly within the 
framework of knowledge systems. Not only is a unified view given, but each 
individual proposal is generalized. Furthermore, some problems in previous pro- 
posals can be solved by using our theory formation framework. 
6.1. Abductiue Logic Programming 
There are some proposals for abduction by using logic programming. 
Eshghi and Kowalski [7] define an abductive framework that can be written as a 
knowledge system (T, HI, where T is a definite Horn logic program (with integrity 
constraints) and H is a set of simple candidate hypotheses (called abducibles) of 
the form A *, where A is a ground atom. This framework is used to give an 
abductive interpretation of negation as failure in general logic programs within the 
stable model semantics. Their framework is expanded by Kakas and Mancarella 
[19], who define an abductive framework (T, HI, where T is a general logic 
program (with integrity constraints) and H is a set of abducibles. Kakas and 
Mancarella define a generalized stable model of (T, H) as any consistent stable 
model of T U E, where E is any subset of H. Thus, our knowledge system for 
abduction is a generalization of these abductive frameworks because ours allow any 
extended logic programs for both facts and candidate hypotheses. 
In addition to Kakas and Mancarella [18], Gelfond [S] proposes another abduc- 
tive framework for logic programs. Gelfond allows the facts T to be an extended 
disjunctive database that is a set of rules of the form 
LIJ*.-IL,@L,+ ,,..., L,,notL,+, )...) rlotL,, 
where n 2 m 2 1 L 0 and each Li is a literal. Here, the symbol “I” means a 
connective of disjunctions, whose semantics is given in Gelfond and Lifschitz [12]. 
Gelfond considers the hypotheses H of the form of literal assertions (8). It is 
possible to extend our framework by allowing such programs for both facts and 
hypotheses according to the semantics. Note that the definitions of explanations are 
different between Kakas and Mancarella [18] and Gelfond [8]: The former uses 
explains,, whereas the latter uses explains, (see Section 3.4). 
It should be also noted that when some candidate hypotheses represent default 
knowledge, abductive frameworks by Gelfond [S] and Kakas and Mancarella [18] 
cannot be applied to default reasoning directly, unlike Poole’s [31] framework. As 
explained in Section 3.4, the fact that a formula has an explanation does not imply 
that the formula is true in an extension base of the knowledge system. 
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6.2. Exceptions 
Kowalski and Sadri [22] propose a technique for contradiction removals within the 
context of default reasoning. Their method deals with a simple form of exceptions 
and translates each rule representing a prototypic property into a normal default 
rule. For instance, in Example 3.6, the extended logic program 
TU {Flies(x) +-Bird(x),not +Xes(x)j 
is obtained from T u I-i by using the Kowalski-Sadri transformation, and has the 
unique answer set that is identical to the extension base of K. The reason why 
their translation works is that the exceptional rule 
7 Flies ( Tweety ) + Penguin( Tweety) 
cancels the normal default rule 
Flies( Tweety ) + Bird( Tweety ) , not TFlies( Tweety ) . 
Compared with our method, there are two limitations in Kowalski and Sadri’s 
technique. 
First, in their method, rules are automatically divided into two (those having 
positive literals as heads and those having negative literals as heads) so that 
negative literals are always exceptions of the positive ones with the same predi- 
cates. Kowalski and Sadri, however, claim that their technique can be extended to 
deal with exceptions with individual rules rather than entire rules and with 
exceptions having positive conclusions. However, if we allow these mixed excep- 
tions at the same time, then we have to take care of the semantics for each 
exception individually because the original answer set semantics of Gelfond and 
Lifschitz [ll] is changed in Kowalski and Sadri [221. Therefore, the techniques 
proposed in this paper are more flexible. 
Example 6.1. If the program II consists of the two contradictory rules 
then by the Kowalski-Sadri transformation, the first rule is replaced by 
P+-not 7P 
and we obtain { ,P} as the unique answer set. If we prefer the positive conclusion 
instead, then we will obtain {PI. Thus, we cannot restore consistency without 
determining which literal we should regard as the exception. On the other hand, if 
we consider the knowledge system (0, II), we can obtain two alternative extension 
bases {P} and ( TP}, without committing to an explicit choice of exceptions. 
Second, our framework for default reasoning and contradiction removals can be 
applied to much broader classes of default knowledge than their method because 
any extended logic program can be a set of candidate hypotheses. Especially, our 
notion of extension bases is not restricted to dealing only with exceptions, but can 
be applied to other types of default reasoning where exceptions may not be given 
explicitly for default knowledge. For instance, Examples 3.8 and 3.11 cannot be 
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dealt with by Kowalski and Sadri [22]. In Example 3.8, there is no exception of the 
hypothesis 
Shaves( Noel, x ) +not Shves(x,x), 
for 4haves(Casarwva, Casanova) is not an exception. Thus, the hypothesis cannot 
be translated in the same way as Example 3.6. In case of the CWA, because 
hypotheses are inherently expressed by normal default rules, the Kowalski-Sadri 
translation does not change the meaning of the original program that may cause 
incoherency. 
6.3. Tm th Maintenance 
We can compare our method for contradiction removals (Section 3.2) to the 
TMS-style computation. According to Elkan 161, a set of rules for Doyle’s [4] TMS 
can be identified with a propositional genera1 logic program with integrity con- 
straints, and the TMS computes a consistent stable model of the program in a 
bottom-up manner. Classical negation is not incorporated in the TMS. 
However, inconsistency resolution in our framework is different from the 
TMS-style contradiction removals in Doyle [4], Giordano and Martelli [13], and 
Elkan [6]. When a contradiction occurs, the TMS imposes a new rule in order to 
believe a literal that has not been believed. As a result of contradiction removals, 
the TMS may fail to output a stable model of the original program. Elkan [6J 
claims that when the TMS finds an inconsistent stable model, it should choose 
another stable model of the program, if one exists. However, such a strategy is not 
tolerant of incoherent programs because it does not output anything if the program 
has no consistent stable model. Giordano and Martelli 1131 consider all possible 
models that may be .output by TM& contradiction removals (called dependency- 
directed backtracking). Although their method reflects an incremental use of the 
TMS, its model theory is no longer stable model semantics in the sense that 
contrapositives of the original rules are interpreted to be valid and that literals 
interpreted to be false by negation as failure in the original program can be 
believed through those contrapositive rules. On the other hand, because our 
method for inconsistency resolution deals with retractable hypotheses explicitly, 
hypotheses alone are invalidated and other rules are never changed. In this sense, 
our knowledge system can be considered as a generalization of nonmonotonic 
ATMSs (Dressier IS]; Junker [18J), which handle TMS rules together with ab- 
ducibles. 
Besides the TMSs, there are some proposals for inconsistency resolution in 
nonmonotonic reasoning. For autoepistemic logic [27], Morris [28] defines stable 
closures when there is no stable expansion. His proposal is motivated by 
dependency-directed backtracking in the TMS, and therefore some formulas are 
believed to remove inconsistencies. Again, we do not add any new formulas, but 
remove a minimal set of hypotheses. For default logic, Guerreiro, Casanova, and 
Hemerly [1.5] propose an alternative definition of extensions. Although this defini- 
tion is quite different from ours, the underlying idea is similar because default 
rules are allowed to be ignored in their extensions to keep the consistency, but no 
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default rule can be dispensed with unless it is necessary to do so. We consider such 
defeasible default rules only for some distinguished rules, rather than for all the 
rules. 
6.4. Pereira et al. 
Recent work by Pereira, Aparicio, and Alferes 1291 independently concerns how to 
represent knowledge for default reasoning by using extended logic programs. By 
their framework, priorities among default knowledge can be formulated within a 
single program. Therefore, their goal is similar to our proposals described in 
Section 4. The differences between the proposals of Pereira et al. [29] and our 
proposals are as follows. 
First, Pereira et al. [29] uses the well founded semantics 1411 as well as the 
three-valued stable model semantics of Przymusinski [33] by permitting the use of 
classical negation. As we have already argued, the theory formation framework 
itself is independent of the underlying semantics. However, some remarks should 
be made here. The well founded semantics provides “cautious’ (or skeptical) 
conclusions rather than alternative solutions. On the other hand, the answer set 
semantics on which our framework is based is very suitable for determining what 
holds in each of the single extensions. In particular, viewing each extension as a 
theory is indispensable for abduction [21]. 
Second, a central concern of Pereira et al. [29] is to “hack” programs so as to 
deal with finer issues in default reasoning. We define the framework metatheoreti- 
tally just by separating the knowledge into two: concrete knowledge and hypotheti- 
cal knowledge. Using H-maximal@ for K = (T, H) enables us to represent default 
knowledge in a more concise and understandable form. Our translation is just to 
show that our theory formation framework can be represented in a single program 
for computation, and the resulting program is not intended at all to be the 
user-provided representation of knowledge. 
Third, they use both naming hypotheses (which we described in Section 4.2) and 
the cancellation technique similar to the Kowalski-Sadri transformation [22] 
(adding not z to the body of a rule whose head is L). This is more complicated 
than our translation because we require only the naming technique. As we have 
already remarked in Section 6.2, it turns out that the cancellation technique is less 
useful than naming hypotheses because the cancellation does not change rules if 
they represent the CWA and because exceptions have to be explicitly listed for the 
cancellation to work. We can thus deal easily with contradiction removals and 
abduction as well as default reasoning within the unified framework for theory 
formation. 
In fact, Pereira et al. also show an approach to contradiction removals within 
the well founded semantics in a separate paper [30],” but this is based on an 
entirely different technique from the paper [29]. Moreover, this method is applica- 
ble only for a special kind of extended logic program whose inconsistencies can be 
removed by retracting some negation-as-failure formulas from rules in the pro- 
“Note that, unlike for general logic programs, the well founded semantics extended with classical 
negation may lead to incoherency (that is, no models) for extended logic programs. 
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grams. Thus, Example 6.1 (where no not appears in the program) cannot be 
handled by their method. 
6.5. Strong Introspection 
Gelfond [9] also considers a flexible representation of a broad class of incomplete 
information. Gelfond extends the syntax and semantics of extended disjunctive 
databases [12] by a new modal operator (called strong& introspective) and develops 
a theory to specify negative information from extended disjunctive databases. Like 
our argument in Section 3.3, Gelfond claims that the simple inclusion of the 
(Reiter’s) CWA rule 1A t not A for each ground atom A is not suitable in 
general, and suggests a new CWA rule that infers a negative literal 4 if and only 
if no answer set of the program contains A. The differences between Gelfond’s 
approach and ours are as follows. 
Because disjunctive information causes multiple answer sets, Gelfond uses a 
new modal operator M for his CWA rule: TP is true in a belief set if MP is not 
true, where an atom MP means that P appears in some answer set. On the other 
hand, our CWA is considered for a nondisjunctive program II, and a maximal 
subset of Reiter’s CWA rules CW is considered for each answer set of II: TP is 
inferred if P is not true in every extension base of (II,CIV>. These two specifica- 
tions do not coincide if our CWA is applied to extended disjunctive databases. 
Example 6.2. Let us consider the following extended disjunctive database: 
PlQe, 
R- -JP, 
R+ -TQ. 
If we add Reiter’s CWA rules for P and Q, 
-7P - not P, 
-YQ + not Q, 
then we get two augmented answer sets: {P, TQ, R} and { TP, Q, R). Hence, we can 
derive R under our CWA. However, if we use Gelfond’s CWA rules for P and Q, 
TP+not MP, 
7Q + not MQ, 
we get two belief sets, {P) and {Q}, and thus R cannot be derived by his 
specification. 
In some cases, Gelfond’s CWA rules are more appropriate for specifying the 
closed world assumption for extended disjunctive databases. In general, we would 
like to choose freely either form of CWA rule for each predicate. An extension of 
our knowledge system by incorporating this strong introspection is an important 
subject for future investigation. 
Another, but more important difference appears when we deal with a consistent 
program_ whose augmentation is inconsistent. For example, for the extended logic 
program 
II={* ,P), 
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Gelfond’s CWA rule for P adds -#, so that the augmentation becomes inconsis- 
tent. However, the knowledge system 
K= (II,{ ,P+notP}) 
does not allow the use of Reiter’s CWA rule for P. Thus, our main concern is to 
keep the consistency of augmentations because we add a maximally consistent set 
of negative Iiterals to each answer set. This problem is not considered by Gelfond’s 
specification. 
6.6. Priority 
The last question is how to divide our common sense knowledge into the factual 
(or background) program and the candidate hypotheses. In other words, how 
should each rule in an extended logic program be placed in either T or H for a 
knowledge system K = CT, H)? One easy way is to associate integriq constraints 
(see Section 2.2) with T and other rules with H. Then integrity constraints must be 
satisfied by every extension base, but a minimal set of other rules may be 
disregarded to keep the consistency. This view of theory formation with integrity 
constraints was first introduced by Goebel, Furukawa, and Poole [14]. In their 
Theorist-S system, each rule in H is a definite clause (without negation as failure) 
and integrity constraints in F are used to retract a minimal set of hypotheses from 
Z-Z until the consistency with F is restored. The theories obtained are exactly our 
extension bases. 
The notion of maximally consistent combination of logic programs is also 
employed by Baral, Kraus, and Minker [l]. They combine multiple programs, say 
II, and II,, which are mutually inconsistent with respect to integrity constraints 
ZC, into a single maximally consistent program II’. Their goal can be simulated by 
considering the knowledge system K = (ZC, II, U III,>, and then by translating it 
into a single logic program K*. In Baral et al. [l], the input programs are restricted 
to stratified logic programs without classical negation, and the output is a disjunc- 
tive stratified program. In contrast, our input programs can be extended logic 
programs, not necessarily stratified, and the output is an extended logic program 
too, without introducing disjunctions. 
A more general view of knowledge systems is to divide the program into 
subprograms (categories) in accordance with the degrees of credibility of default 
knowledge, where the priority is determined depending on the problem domain. 
This view of hypothetical reasoning is exactly the same idea as Rescher [381. When 
there are more than two categories for a problem, we may have an extended 
knowledge system like K = (ZZ,, H,, . . . , H,). Along this line, an extended frame- 
work for hypothetical reasoning based on first-order logic is considered by Brewka 
[3] as an extension of Poole’s [31] framework. It may be possible to extend our 
framework in the same way as Brewka [31. 
Finally, hypothetical reasoning can be used in conjunction with an inductive 
system. l1 An inductive method can provide estimates of the correctness or the 
generality of knowledge and can serve as the basis for deciding whether each rule 
should be placed in T, Ho, or H,, . . . , H,. An extended knowledge system then 
“This view of knowledge systems was suggested by Pave1 Brazdil. 
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could be used to identify potential inconsistencies and to suggest how to remove 
them. This last information will be used for further refinements in the inductive 
system. In this way, we can represent and classify knowledge at the same time that 
we can use knowledge systems for common sense reasoning. 
7. SUMMARY 
By expanding the notion of classical negation and the consistency, we proposed a 
uniform framework based on theory formation called knowledge systems, which 
can be used to represent various forms of reasoning of interest in logic program- 
ming. In a knowledge system, candidate hypotheses H are dealt with as a part of 
knowledge distinct from a program T about the world, and hypotheses are used to 
augment the theory and to predict what we expect to be true. 
One of the main tasks of a knowledge system is to find a maximal subset E of H 
such that there is a consistent answer set of the extended logic program T u E. If 
adding hypotheses causes inconsistencies, then a minimal set of hypotheses can be 
ignored to remove inconsistencies. This framework can also be used for abduction 
and for important functions of logic programming such as contradiction removals 
and the closed world assumptions, 
We also proposed the translation of a knowledge system K to a single extended 
logic program K* such that each answer set of K* exactly corresponds to an 
answer set of a consistent theory from K, and vice versa. By using this translation, 
we can use any query-answering or model-generation procedure to compute 
hypothetical reasoning. 
Although theory formation and hypothetical reasoning have mainly been pro- 
posed in AI using first-order logic, this paper suggested that these concepts are also 
very useful for logic programs with nonmonotonic behaviors. As a result, we can 
conclude that hypothetical reasoning is not only essential for many reasoning 
aspects of AI, but very helpful for a uniform approach to solving many important 
problems for logic programming. 
This is an extended version of a previous paper [16]. I wish to thank anonymous referees for their 
helpful comments on earlier versions. I am also grateful to Koichi Furukawa, Vladimir Lifschitz, Ray 
Reiter, Chiaki Sakama, and Ken Satoh for helpful discussions on this work. This work was done as part 
of the Fifth Generation Computer Project while the author was at Institute for New Generation 
Computer Technology. The author is supported in part by Tokyo Information Systems Research 
Laboratory, Matsushita Electric Industrial, Co. Ltd. 
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